{"id":4955,"date":"2026-09-07T12:45:19","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T16:45:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/?p=4955"},"modified":"2026-09-07T12:45:22","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T16:45:22","slug":"what-nikes-ceo-failed-to-understand","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/what-nikes-ceo-failed-to-understand\/","title":{"rendered":"What Nike\u2019s CEO Failed to Understand"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Positioning, capital allocation and the cost of getting the business wrong<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In March 2024, Nike\u2019s chief financial officer described the mistake with unusual clarity. Matt Friend said the company had been \u201cmore focused on trying to achieve a mix of marketplace targets than we have on serving consumer demand where the consumer is shopping.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Read that again. A business built around athletes had become too focused on where it wanted the transaction to happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That admission gets us closer to Nike\u2019s problem than a falling stock chart. It identifies a decision management could control. Customers had shopping habits, needs and alternatives. Nike had a preferred channel mix. Somewhere along the way, the second became more important than the first.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

My reading of the evidence is that Nike\u2019s leadership misunderstood what it could safely optimize. It pushed harder on direct sales and familiar products while weakening parts of the organization and marketplace that helped make Nike worth choosing. The damage was uneven. Some exceptional products survived. Some customers never left. That makes the failure more revealing: a company can keep its famous identity while making decisions that steadily undermine its economics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Screenshot<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Warren Buffett supplied the useful filter decades earlier. In his 1987 shareholder letter, he explained that the skills which get someone promoted often differ from the skills needed to allocate capital. A capable functional leader can reach the top without learning how to decide where the next dollar belongs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At Nike, the question goes further. Can a leader allocate capital well without understanding how this particular business earns the right to make money?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before we answer, one correction matters. John Donahoe came from Bain. He had already led Bain, eBay and ServiceNow. He had served on Nike\u2019s board since 2014. This was an experienced executive, selected by a board that wanted his digital expertise. His r\u00e9sum\u00e9 makes the failure harder to dismiss as simple inexperience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the swoosh had earned<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When I talk about positioning, I start with what a business makes true for people. A claim needs something underneath it: a product, a service, an experience, a pattern of decisions that gives the words weight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Nike, athletic achievement is useful territory to examine. But declaring that Nike \u201cowns achievement\u201d ends the inquiry too early. We need to look at the proof, who experienced it, and whether the company kept making it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider a Nike-funded study (Hoogkamer and colleagues\u2019<\/a>) published online in 2017. Eighteen highly trained male runners tested a prototype racing shoe against two established racing models. At matched shoe mass, the prototype reduced the energetic cost of running by roughly 4%. This was a controlled laboratory result, with clear limits. It did not promise every buyer a 4% faster marathon. It did show that Nike could put a measurable performance benefit under someone\u2019s feet. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is a different kind of credibility from simply saying you care about athletes. The product gives the claim evidence. Athletes give the product demanding tests. Communication makes the achievement visible. Distribution lets other people experience a version of that promise themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These activities have to work together. A brilliant racing shoe can build belief, but the person buying a daily trainer still has to like running in it. A campaign can make a shoe desirable, but the retailer has to have the right size. A famous archive can attract collectors, but the next release still has to feel worth wanting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is where positioning meets the balance sheet. Customers\u2019 willingness to choose, pay and return has business value. The company keeps earning that value through choices about people, products, prices and access. Remove the words from the campaign, and those choices remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

My earlier article<\/a> about Elliott Hill argued that restoring Nike required realigning those choices. That remains a useful starting point. What needs a harder test is the assumption that announcing the right direction means the recovery has happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The same standard applies to the decline. Nike\u2019s earlier success does not establish that every old practice deserved protection. A large organization can accumulate duplication, weak products and unnecessary complexity. The CEO\u2019s job is to distinguish those things from the capabilities that make the company valuable. Cutting both can look efficient for a while.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bet had a reasonable beginning<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Donahoe inherited a direction already in motion. Under Mark Parker, Nike\u2019s 2017 Consumer Direct Offence combined closer consumer relationships with faster product creation, fewer styles, deeper selections within key franchises and greater focus on important markets. Digital expansion was part of Nike\u2019s strategy before Donahoe became CEO. Nike\u2019s 2017 strategy<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The board then chose a leader (Nike\u2019s appointment announcement<\/a>) it believed could accelerate that direction. Parker stayed as executive chairman. This was a company mandate, with continuity at the top. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was a sensible business case. Selling through your own stores and website can give you more control over presentation, pricing, inventory, and customer relationships. It can also let you retain revenue that would otherwise belong to a retailer. During a pandemic, the ability to serve customers digitally had obvious value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By June 2021, that opportunity had become an ambitious destination. Nike told investors (Nike\u2019s June 2021 earnings call<\/a>) it expected Direct to account for 60% of its business by fiscal 2025, with owned digital at 40%. Management connected the shift to better inventory decisions, more full-price selling and higher margins. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The early financial picture did not immediately refute the bet. Revenue rose from $39.1 billion in fiscal 2019 to $44.5 billion in fiscal 2021. Nike was growing through an extraordinary disruption (Nike\u2019s FY2021 filing<\/a>). The harder question was whether pandemic behaviour would persist at the scale the plan required. And whether customers wanted enough of Nike\u2019s products, often enough, to support its preferred route to market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Owning a checkout does not answer either question. It gives the company control over a transaction once the customer decides to make it. The customer still controls the decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A channel target can help coordinate investment. It becomes dangerous when the organization starts arranging the customer around the target. Friend\u2019s March 2024 admission indicates (Nike\u2019s March 2024 earnings call<\/a>) that Nike recognized it had crossed that line. By then, management was saying those earlier mix ambitions would no longer guide its plans. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is a failure of strategic judgment: allowing a means of serving demand to become an objective with a life of its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The organization learned what counted<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nike made the direction tangible in July 2020. Its Consumer Direct Acceleration installed a simpler structure around men, women and kids, alongside changes to leadership and technology (Nike\u2019s July 2020 reorganization<\/a>). The stated aim was better consumer understanding and faster growth. Many of the people appointed were experienced Nike executives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The labels themselves prove little. Women\u2019s needs deserve specific attention. A sport structure can become siloed. A consumer structure can work. The important questions concern who knows the sport, who writes the product brief, who can challenge a forecast and who gets the resources to act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were warnings before the later crisis made criticism easy. In January 2022, Business Insider reported concerns about departures and loss<\/a> of experience. An anonymous former designer warned that footwear development times would delay the visible effects of talent losses until late 2022 and 2023. The reporting also included support for Donahoe\u2019s pandemic response. It offers a contemporary warning, not an audited map of every capability Nike lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Former executive Massimo Giunco<\/a> later connected category disruption, lost knowledge, wholesale retreat and performance marketing in his critique of Nike. His account is valuable testimony from someone with relevant experience. It cannot, on its own, establish the size or isolated effect of each decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The incentive record is more concrete. Nike introduced digital revenue into its fiscal 2021 annual bonus design<\/a> expressly to support Consumer Direct Acceleration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fiscal 2023, adjusted revenue, adjusted digital revenue and adjusted EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) each carried one-third of the annual incentive calculation. Digital was being counted inside total revenue and separately as a strategic priority. This was one part of compensation; long-term awards made up most of the package.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A bonus plan cannot tell us what Donahoe privately believed. It does tell us what the organization formally rewarded. Digital growth had a status that neither a running-store recommendation nor the quality of a future product brief had in that annual formula.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were limits to the incentive story, too. Donahoe received no annual incentive payout for fiscal 2022 after results missed thresholds, even though the committee adjusted payouts for other named executives. And Nike removed the separate digital metric for fiscal 2024, before Hill returned. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those facts matter because Nike did recognize problems and alter its measures. The failure was in the judgment behind the original commitments and the adequacy of the correction. We do not need to invent a leader who never listened or a board that rewarded every result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The organizational risk is easy to understand. A business can have plenty of talented people and still make it difficult for their knowledge to shape decisions. It can measure sales precisely while paying too little attention to the conditions that will produce the next one.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A retailer was doing more than taking a margin<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The wholesale retreat shows what an internal target can miss.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In February 2022, Foot Locker told investors<\/a> it expected its largest vendor to account for no more than 55% of supplier spending in the fourth quarter, compared with 65% a year earlier. It linked the expected change to that vendor\u2019s accelerated direct strategy and its own diversification. The same release described expanded opportunities with brands including Puma and Reebok. These were plans, rather than completed results, but the commercial response was already explicit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A retailer has its own business to protect. If a supplier pulls back, the retailer can give more space, attention and effort to somebody else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For a customer comparing shoes, that matters. The store provides availability and comparison. Its staff can help translate a product into a recommendation. The relationship has value beyond the margin Nike gives up on a wholesale sale. Losing some of that value may be acceptable. Assuming it is all recoverable through an app requires evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nike itself demonstrated an alternative during the same period. Its November 2021 partnership<\/a> with Dick\u2019s connected membership programmes and combined digital benefits with products and store experiences. The company could pursue closer relationships with consumers through a retailer. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

And repairs began under Donahoe. In June 2023, reporting on DSW and Macy\u2019s earnings calls<\/a> described plans to bring Nike back. Macy\u2019s chief executive said customers had been disappointed by its absence and had asked for its return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is a useful customer signal. Some people still wanted Nike. They wanted it where they shopped. Management\u2019s distribution decision had created friction between existing desire and a completed sale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Product concentration then made the channel problem harder to unwind. In October 2024, before Hill started, Nike\u2019s CFO described a portfolio too dependent on classic franchises. Nike was cutting Air Force 1, Air Jordan 1 and Dunk supply. Those franchises had attractive margins, particularly in digital, but digital sales of them were down nearly 50% as Nike reduced volumes. Wholesale trends were better. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is the mechanism I think the evidence supports. Familiar products help a channel deliver attractive near-term numbers. The business leans on them. Demand weakens or supply gets ahead of desire. Promotions can clear inventory, but they can also affect the customer\u2019s reference price and the retailer\u2019s ability to sell at full price. The repair requires reducing revenue from products that previously helped the plan look successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The accounts cannot assign an exact dollar loss to every step. The sequence is still more informative than saying ecommerce failed. Nike had to repair the interaction among its product offering, distribution, and pricing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Follow the money without making up the alternative<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capital allocation is where these judgments accumulate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Across fiscal 2020 through 2024, Nike generated $27.6 billion of operating cash flow. It spent $4.32 billion on property, plant and equipment, repurchased $17.42 billion of shares and paid $9.11 billion in dividends. Shareholder distributions totalled $26.53 billion, or about 114% of operating cash flow after that capital expenditure. These are calculations<\/a> from Nike\u2019s cash-flow statements; the fiscal window does not exactly match Donahoe\u2019s tenure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

That establishes the scale of the choices. It does not establish that every buyback was wrong. Nor can we call the $4.32 billion Nike\u2019s entire investment in the future. Product work, research, people and marketing include expenses that do not appear in that capital-expenditure line. Treating a buyback-to-capex ratio as proof that Nike abandoned innovation would reproduce the same mistake we are examining: allowing an accounting category to substitute for understanding the business.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The marketing figures require similar care. Nike\u2019s demand-creation expense was $3.75 billion in fiscal 2019 and $4.29 billion in fiscal 2024. Revenue grew faster, so the expense fell as a share of sales. But Nike plainly continued spending substantial money. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Its fiscal 2021 filing also described lower brand and retail marketing, and postponed sporting events, partly offset by higher digital marketing. That supports a change in spending composition during the pandemic. It does not tell us how much later advertising created incremental demand, or how much merely captured a purchase that would have happened anyway. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The public record therefore supports a sharper capital-allocation question than \u201cWhy didn\u2019t they spend more?\u201d What did Nike believe each commitment would protect or create, and how well did that belief match the source of future demand?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A useful product team can look expensive before its next launch earns a dollar. A retailer relationship can look costly if the analysis counts the margin surrendered and misses the access gained. An established franchise can look highly productive while the company is consuming the customer\u2019s appetite for it. Those are valuation problems inside the business. The CEO has to assess them before choosing what to expand, simplify or stop. Finance can calculate the consequences of assumptions. Leadership still has to decide whether the assumptions describe reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is a further responsibility when returning cash. Management should be able to explain why the remaining commitments are enough to sustain the earning power on which its valuation rests. Public filings do not disclose Nike\u2019s rejected product proposals or the returns available on every alternative. They do show why the board should demand that explanation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buffett\u2019s filter becomes practical here. Skill in capital allocation includes knowing what deserves patient funding, what deserves restraint and what should be allowed to shrink. Cost reduction without that knowledge can remove the very thing the next growth plan will need to rebuild.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Customers did not deliver one verdict<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The easiest version of the Nike story says innovation disappeared, runners left, and the brand died. The evidence suggests otherwise. In October 2023, Kelvin Kiptum ran a world-record marathon of 2:00:35 in Chicago. Nike identified his shoe as a development version of the Alphafly 3<\/a>. Elite performance credibility was still being renewed during Donahoe\u2019s tenure. That does not make the shoe responsible for the whole achievement. It makes the claim \u201cNike stopped innovating\u201d untenable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The everyday product experience was less consistent. Running Shoes Guru<\/a> bought and tested the Pegasus 41 in 2024. Its reviewer praised the fit, durability and grip, but found the ride firm and unexciting, with weaker value at $140 than several alternatives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

RunRepeat\u2019s<\/a> assessment was more positive: it regarded the same model as a worthwhile upgrade, particularly for heel strikers. Its page has since been updated, so it should not be read as an untouched contemporary verdict. Different runners and tests produced different judgments. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Competitors were also building products worth choosing. Doctors of Running\u2019s<\/a> review of the Hoka Mach 6 described a light, lively trainer with broad usefulness, while flagging fit and durability trade-offs. The reviewers disclosed free samples and affiliate relationships. Their experience offers a concrete competitive explanation beyond Nike leaving a shelf empty. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We should also examine the broader signals as well. Strava named Pegasus its top running-shoe family in 2024. In 2025, ASICS Novablast led, Pegasus ranked second, and Hoka Clifton third. These are rankings within Strava\u2019s recorded activity and gear data, rather than a census of shoe purchases (Strava\u2019s 2024 report<\/a> Strava\u2019s 2025 report<\/a>). They show a change in the platform\u2019s ranking alongside continued use of Nike. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In sneakers, StockX<\/a> reported Nike and Jordan as its leading two brands for 2025, with average prices up 5% and 6%. A resale platform is a particular market, but it is enough to challenge a claim that Nike\u2019s cultural value had vanished. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lesson is more uncomfortable than total collapse. A business can remain famous, admired and profitable while losing its advantage in particular situations. Someone can respect Nike\u2019s racing technology, own Jordans and buy a different shoe for tomorrow\u2019s run. \u201cThe customer\u201d is too broad a category to explain that choice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On also challenges the theory that direct distribution was inherently the wrong model. In the second quarter of 2026, DTC accounted for 45.7% of sales and grew 26% on a reported<\/a> basis. Wholesale grew 4.8%. Management was deliberately managing wholesale supply to support full-price business. Direct growth and selective distribution could coexist with commercial strength.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On\u2019s smaller scale and different mix prevent a clean experiment against Nike. Its results still remove the easy excuse. The channel cannot explain the outcome by itself. The product, demand, price and discipline behind the channel matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hill has to earn the recovery<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elliott Hill returned as CEO on 14 October 2024. His long Nike career gave him experience with the business and its people. It did not exempt him from having to prove his decisions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On his first earnings call, Hill described excessive reliance on a few sportswear franchises, a digital business with too much promotional selling and a need to reconnect with sport and local markets. He also praised expertise added while he had been away. Even his diagnosis was more nuanced than the claim that Donahoe had removed every useful capability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Donahoe had already begun an organizational correction. In March 2024, he said Nike had reintroduced sport-focused teams starting the previous June, within the men\u2019s, women\u2019s and kids\u2019 structure. Hill\u2019s later enterprise changes went further. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hill subsequently changed who held authority. In May 2025, Nike gave expanded consumer-and-sport marketing and product-creation responsibilities to Amy Montagne, Nicole Graham, and Phil McCartney, who report directly to him. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By October, Hill was describing an organization built around sports rather than the men\u2019s, women\u2019s and kids\u2019 structure, with smaller teams accountable for understanding their athletes and delivering business results. That is a material operating commitment. Its value depends on what those teams can now notice, decide and build. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are promising product signals. RoadTrailRun\u2019s<\/a> 2025 Vomero Plus review praised the cushioning and enjoyable ride, although its testers differed in their preferences. The site disclosed free samples. This is evidence of a product that pleased particular runners, rather than proof of a completed turnaround. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The improvement was uneven. Running Shoes Guru\u2019s<\/a> review of the Pegasus 42 in June 2026 still found its ride less responsive and versatile than competing trainers, while recognizing its durability and fit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

And product credit needs a calendar. Nike discussed the spring 2025 running line before Hill began. Later, it said Nike Mind had spent more than ten years in development. New leadership can improve focus, launch and execution. It cannot have originated every product that appears on its watch. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The financial recovery remains incomplete. Fiscal 2026 revenue was $46.4 billion, nearly flat with 2025 and about 9.7% below 2024. Nike Brand wholesale grew 6% on a reported basis, while Direct declined 6%. Greater China remained weak. The business was moving differently across channels and markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even a strong-looking margin needs inspection. Fiscal 2026 fourth-quarter gross margin reached 49.2%, including roughly nine percentage points from a recognized tariff recovery. That quarterly jump cannot be treated as clear evidence of restored pricing power. Across the full year, the recovery largely offset tariffs incurred in the same year; subtracting it alone would create another misleading picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hill\u2019s task involves some costly refusals: less dependence on familiar franchises, less promotional volume, and enough time for new products and relationships to work. Those choices can depress reported sales during repair. Continuing weakness can also reflect demand that has not returned. Management has to show which is which.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The test is sustained customer demand across a healthier range of products, with partners able to sell profitably and economics that hold up after temporary effects are understood. Employee confidence and a better campaign may help. Neither settles the question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The skill the job required<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Donahoe faced a pandemic, supply disruption, changing tastes and capable rivals. Nike\u2019s fiscal 2022 filing documented freight pressure, inventory problems and China disruption. Those forces belong in the explanation. Holding a CEO accountable does not require pretending he controlled them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

His responsibility was to decide how Nike should respond, what it could risk and what evidence would change the plan. The board\u2019s responsibility was to test that judgment, including the assumptions behind the expertise it had hired.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were visible alternatives. Nike could build digital capability while collaborating with retailers; the Dick\u2019s partnership demonstrated that. It could preserve sport expertise while changing how teams worked. It could limit reliance on classic products before the correction became a major revenue problem. None promised an easy outcome. Each required a more complete view of what the business depended on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we are going to call part of this story stupid, the specific stupidity was treating a preferred commercial arrangement as though customers owed Nike the behaviour needed to make it work. The CFO\u2019s admission establishes that the company eventually recognized the error. The talent concerns, incentive design, channel repair and product concentration show why the consequences extended beyond a missed forecast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is my judgment from the combined evidence. It is not a claim that one executive caused every dollar of lost market value, or that every digital investment failed. A share-price decline mixes business performance with expectations, valuation and wider market conditions. The operating record provides a firmer basis for criticism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Positioning puts the CEO\u2019s decisions in view. The position a company earns is lived through its products, its people and the terms on which customers encounter it. When those things change, a familiar logo cannot guarantee a familiar experience.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A leader who understands that asks more demanding questions before approving the plan. What does this choice make better for the people who choose us? Which capability must survive for the forecast to be credible? What evidence would tell us we are wrong? What are we willing to give up now to remain worth choosing later?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These questions belong in budget reviews, product decisions and board meetings. They should shape who has authority and what earns a reward. Otherwise, positioning remains a description that the business can contradict with its next allocation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nike\u2019s case shows how much judgment can be missing beneath an impressive r\u00e9sum\u00e9. The essential skill was understanding what made Nike\u2019s money possible, and protecting it while the company changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The swoosh could carry yesterday\u2019s meaning into tomorrow. Leadership still had to give people a reason to believe it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Positioning, capital allocation and the cost of getting the business wrong In March 2024, Nike\u2019s chief financial officer described the mistake with unusual clarity. Matt Friend said the company had been \u201cmore focused on trying to achieve a mix of marketplace targets than we have on serving consumer demand where the consumer is shopping.\u201d Read […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4966,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_coblocks_attr":"","_coblocks_dimensions":"","_coblocks_responsive_height":"","_coblocks_accordion_ie_support":"","footnotes":"","rank_math_title":"","rank_math_description":"","rank_math_canonical_url":"","rank_math_focus_keyword":""},"categories":[82,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4955","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-autopsy","category-positioning"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4955","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4955"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4955\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4968,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4955\/revisions\/4968"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4966"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4955"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4955"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/paulsyng.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4955"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}